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Introduction
Ethical issues associated with genetically modified animals include more than objections, as is discussed in the first section of the paper. The second section describes the differences between analytic and substantive research in ethics. The balance of the paper is an analytic review of objections to genetically modified animals, with particular attention in the final section to religion and metaphysical objections.
Throughout this paper the terms moral and morality refer to norms and codes of conduct that are explicitly shared or implicitly accepted by the members of a social group. The term ethics will be used to indicate the disciplined study of morality. In light of the fact that professional ethicists make arguments that support prescriptions for conduct and policy, this distinction becomes difficult to maintain. It is not, in fact, recognized by many ethicists. Readers should be cautioned that the definitions here do not possess the rigor of scientific definitions.
Ethics Includes More Than Objections
Techniques of recombinant DNA transfer have created the potential for important new technologies in agriculture and medicine, but they have also raised a large number of ethical issues. To the credit of scientists and research administrators, ethical issues have been taken far more seriously than they were for radiation technologies such as food irradiation and nuclear power. Beginning with the Asilomar Conference of 1976 (Goodfield, 1977) , informed scientific J. h i m . Sci. 1993. 71(Suppl. 3):51-56 participants have exhibited a high degree of social responsibility by participating in open public debate on the social and ethical issues associated with new discoveries in molecular biology.
In the 1980s social and ethical issues took shape along two lines. One was a series of regulatory debates over specific products of biotechnology, with public controversy centering on ice nucleating bacteria (Thompson, 1987) and bovine somatotropin (Hallberg, 1992) . The second line of public debate arose in connection with patenting the novel organisms created through genetic engineering. In both cases, the topic of "social and ethical issues" emerged as a catch-all category of miscellaneous objections to biotechnology.
This turn of events is unfortunate for three reasons.
First, there are important ethical reasons to support and encourage biotechnology. It is inappropriate to assume that ethics weighs in against recombinant technologies. Second, as ethical issues have come t o be understood as miscellaneous objections, well-characterized issues such as health and safety have been excluded from the category. Yet, health and safety are ethical concerns, and it is far from clear how criteria of acceptable risk or risk benefit trade-offs should be decided 199 1) . Third, as ethics have come to be associated with the grab-bag of miscellaneous objections, ethical reasoning has come to appear far less logically coherent and rationally anchored than it is. This problem is particularly evident in the debate over patents, where objections and concerns that are largely irrelevant to the questions of patents are expressed routinely (Lesser, 1988) .
Research on Ethics
Research on ethical issues in biotechnology is of two kinds: analytic and substantive. Analytic research aims to survey the arguments for and against a given policy or practice and to identify their main normative and empirical premises. This research is capable of demonstrating whether these premises indeed bear upon the prescriptions they are alleged to support. It is also capable of exposing errors that arise from false beliefs about facts, or from equivocation, conceptual confusion, or fallacious reasoning.
Conceptual errors are committed by both opponents and supporters of biotechnology. Two examples will illustrate the point. One objection to genetic engineering expresses the claim that consuming foods that include DNA derived from human beings is a form of cannibalism. Literal use of the term cannibalism entails the eating of flesh from a human being, and usually implies that the victim has been murdered or sacrificially killed by the cannibal. There are many longstanding human activities that involve consumption of products derived from the bodies of others. It should not be necessary to specify them explicitly. Although some of these practices are regarded as unwholesome or unethical, none would be regarded as a form of cannibalism. The equation of eating food from human DNA with cannibalism is supportable only as a metaphor. The metaphor successfully communicates the speaker's extreme disapproval of this particular form of genetic engineering, but it does not provide the basis for an ethical argument against it.
A second example can be found in the statement of scientists who defend a modification of organisms on the ground that natural processes of mutation, gene migration, and selection produce more radical and uncontrolled modifications routinely. The fallacy in this argument was exposed by John Stuart Mill, who said, "In sober truth, nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another, are nature's every day performances" (Mill, 1983 ). Mill's point is that ethics is concerned primarily with the consequences of intentional acts. Though the harmful consequences may not have been intended, the acts that caused them were undertaken purposefully and with deliberate action. Intentionality is a crucial criterion for bringing ethical evaluations into play. Where there are no intentional acts, ethics has no bearing; hence, it is no defense of a human action to say that nature is worse. It may indeed be relevant to note that limited resources should be directed to naturally produced risks more than to the risks of biotechnology caused by humans, but this is a far more sophisticated claim. Scientists are advised t o express themselves clearly.
The second general category of ethics research is t o construct rigorous arguments to support specific prescriptions or recommendations. Unlike popular arguments, rigorous arguments should make normative claims explicit and should not include extraneous or spurious claims that do not bear upon the conclusion. This substantive research produces advocacy for or against a view, and it is regarded quite like the advocacy that a lawyer undertakes on behalf of a client. As in a legal proceeding, the methodological assumption is that objective evaluation emerges from the point and counterpoint of two strongly argued views. Unfortunately, there are few people arguing the case for biotechnology that know how to play by these rules. In the literature on genetic engineering, Lesser (19881, Sagoff (1988) , Krimsky (1982 Krimsky ( , 1991 and Comstock (1988 Comstock ( , 1989 are producing substantive research, and Thompson (1992) and Burkhardt ( 1 9 9 2 ) are producing analytic research.
Opposition to Biotechnology: An Analytic Overview
Arguments opposing animal biotechnology can be divided into two categories: 1 ) concerns of technological ethics that might be raised with regard to the general unintended consequences of technical change and 2 ) concerns that relate specifically to biotechnology in virtue of new techniques for moving genetic materials from one organism to another. The distinction is analytically important. Concerns typically associated with technological ethics will tend t o be related to some products of biotechnology, but not others, or they will refer to general social institutions for the management and production of technical change. Biotechnology is currently at the forefront of technical change. Citizens of developed countries have become somewhat discriminating in making evaluations of new technology. It is appropriate and unsurprising that biotechnology would become both a target of concern and a case study for evolving institutions to manage technical change. Nevertheless, these issues are "product, not process" issues. Thompson (1987 Thompson ( , 1992 and Burkhardt (1992) have both written on biotechnologies that provide examples of ethical issues associated with technical change. Burkhardt identifies five general types of ethical issue. Personal issues concern personal choices about whether to adopt a technology and how to use it. Societal issues concern the unintended economic and social impacts of technology, well documented for bST (Hallberg, 1992) . Presentation issues concern the ethics of how a technology is marketed, advertised, and presented both to potential adopters and to the public a t large. Institutional issues concern the organization and management of both public and private research groups. Finally, cultural issues concern the general attitude toward technology and technical change. Burkhardt follows the case of bST to illustrate how each of these is relevant t o biotechnology. Each type of issue might arise with regard to chemical, information, or energy technologies. The ethical arguments would be very similar for each, though different groups of people would be affected. One may conclude that although there are issues here that deserve serious consideration, none of the arguments in this group provides general objections to the transfer of genetic material, though specific products or institutions might be subject to criticism.
Among arguments that relate to biotechnology in a way that does not apply generally to technical change, concerns about patenting can be treated as a special case. Patent law is, in fact, a social institution designed to manage and encourage technical change. The ethical issues that arise in modifying patent law are thus examples of Burkhardt's fourth category. The ability to transfer genetic material with or without new recombinant techniques has raised a series of issues in patent law that are primarily institutional, but some of the claims made on behalf of or against new interpretations of patent codes turn upon issues that are unique to biology, if not to genetic engineering. The question of whether and when segments of genetic code can be owned is an example. Detailed review of these issues is beyond the scope of this discussion (see Sagoff, 1988; Hettinger, 1992; Thompson, 1992) .
The most troublesome and conceptually difficult objections to genetically modified animals make the claim that modification of animal genomes is itself wrong, irrespective of secondary costs and benefits. The OTA report Patenting Life refers to them as "metaphysical and theological arguments" (OTA, 1988) . They are the most potent objections in that arguments discussed previously merely qualify the direction and application of biotechnology. Metaphysical and theological arguments might provide grounds to prohibit it altogether. The final sections of this paper examine these arguments in more detail.
Metaphysical and Theological Objections
The residue of arguments that do not fit into categories of technological ethics or patenting life include arguments that base normative evaluations upon species boundaries. These are the issues that are particularly relevant for genetically modified animals. Ethical judgments throughout history have placed emphasis on group boundaries. At its most primitive, ethical responsibility may have been confined to tribal loyalties. The ancient Greeks, inventors of Western philosophical traditions, defined ethical responsibility according to a hierarchy in which the stringency of obligation is reduced as one moves from the family to the city-state, from the city-state to Hellenic peoples, from Greeks to other humans, and from humans to the balance of nature (MacIntyre, 1988) . Boundaries that establish rights, privileges, and obligations within a hierarchical scheme were implicit components of morality in virtually every human society. Members of the nobility would owe duties to one another that were not owed to commoners; men owed duties t o other men that they did not owe to women.
As implicit components of morality, hierarchies were often unnoticed and seldom defended explicitly. However, the emergence of European science coincided with a series of philosophical challenges to hierarchical organization of ethical and political obligations. Important scientists from Boyle to Pasteur were intimately involved in a step-by-step transition toward egalitarian morality and democratic politics. The history of these developments is too complex to summarize here. Nineteenth-century conflicts over the ethical and theological significance of evolutionary biology should be well known to applied biologists. To some extent, they continue in our own time (Bowler, 1984) .
Although much of the public controversy over biotechnology has focussed on unintended consequences that have little to do with the science itself, one cannot overlook an undercurrent of protest that seems fixed upon the matter of implicit boundaries. The United Methodist Church (19921, for example, adopted a resolution on genetic science at its General Conference, which reads in part:
Failure to accept limits by rejecting or ignoring accountability to God and interdependency with the whole of creation is the essence of sin. Therefore, the question is not can we perform all prodigious works of research and technology, but should we?
The resolution goes on to endorse genetic technologies in general, and to qualify their application largely along lines that conform to technological ethics, though it does oppose patents on organisms based on "the sanctity of God's creation and God's ownership of life" ( p 5 ) .
The acceptance of boundaries and limitations has twin complications. First, it imbues the human species with a unique moral and theological status. The implicit acceptance of boundaries permits articles of faith, such as "The ability to receive God's Holy Spirit is unique to human beings among all creatures," (Stump, 1992 ) from a popular devotional magazine article titled "What Makes Us Human." Second, boundaries establish absolute constraints on conduct, without regard to beneficial consequences. Conservative religious opposition to abortion and research using human fetal tissue provides an example. Theoretical molecular biology challenges the intellectual basis for implicit acceptance of boundaries. Applied molecular biology has become the messenger that brings this challenge to the mass public.
The challenge consists in the knowledge that recombinant DNA is effectively a new reproductive pathway that does not respect species boundaries. Like evolutionary theory, recombinant DNA provides a strong reason to question the existence of any ( p 2 ) metaphysical boundary between human beings and other life forms. Because boundaries are largely implicit in the practice and culture of human society, events that lead to explicit public awareness of boundary assumptions may themselves be thought unethical. The public act of questioning boundaries may be thought inimical to society's interest in promoting good conduct. Research that raises these questions can itself be interpreted as a form of questioning, even when researchers have no such intent.
There may, in fact, be confusion between the two implications of boundaries outlined above. On the one hand, boundaries imbue humans with a unique status; on the other, they establish absolute constraints on conduct. Logically, these may be entirely separable issues. Raising questions about the uniqueness of humans does not, on the face of it, also imply a questioning of absolute constraints on conduct, but it is easy to confuse the questions. Furthermore, one cannot rule out the possibility that the two questions are philosophically, psychologically, or socially linked in some way that has been unexplicated so far. As such, practices that challenge implicit boundaries take on ominous significance, particularly for those who imagine morality to depend on a tightly knit fabric of personal norms, philosophical and religious justifications, and social reinforcement.
Species Boundaries: Four Strategies for Evaluation
To summarize, the main thrust of metaphysical and theological concerns is that crossing species lines might itself violate an absolute constraint. One reason for thinking so might be found in the view that God commands us to respect these boundaries, but most religious groups have preferred an argument based on implicit boundaries, rather than divine commands. One strategy for making this argument is to demonstrate that public morality depends on acceptance of a dogma, without regard to its scientific basis. This approach relies on sociology and politics far more than philosophy, and it will not be examined further here. A second strategy is to examine the principles on which boundaries might be drawn or defended, and to assess the potential for interpreting ethical action that such principles provide. Four philosophical approaches to the boundary question are discussed briefly: fundamentalism, conventionalism, dualism, and naturalism.
Fundamentalism. One response to biology's challenge is simply to ignore or deny it. Philosophically one make8 a personal commitment to a hierarchy of beliefs. One's ability to remain committed to the most fundamental beliefs in the hierarchy is regarded as a test of faith, moral fortitude, and personal courage. Evidence and logic that challenge these beliefs must be rejected. If the fundamentalist faces a choice between science and accepted dogma, science will lose every time.
Fundamentalism is an increasingly prevalent philosophy, and should not be simply dismissed as irrational or emotional. Such a dismissal displays ignorance of the coolness and intellectual complexity that often accompanies fundamentalist views. Nevertheless, fundamentalism has the capacity to inspire fanatical devotion both to ideological views and t o charismatic leaders. There is no philosophical basis to predict the implications of fundamentalism for genetic engineering in animal science. To the extent that fundamentalism provides a basis to simply ignore the implications of molecular biology, the believer develops a psychological capacity to separate scientific theory and technological or business practice from questions of ethical conduct and religious belief. Such a habit of mind sanctions uncritical acceptance of existing patterns of conduct, and would presumably have little implication for animal biotechnology. Fundamentalists might also become convinced that molecular biology is a Satanic force, corrupting souls and transgressing God's order. If so, the implications would be dramatic. Either view is philosophically compatible with the philosophical elements of fundamentalism. Western fundamentalists may ignore the creation of genetically modified animals but a charismatic preacher espousing strongly antagonistic views might provoke significant opposition.
Conventionalism.
Since Hobbes ( 1 6 5 11, philosophers have entertained the idea that morality is simply an agreement based on long-term mutual self-interest. Conventionalism solves the boundary problem by drawing boundaries through a promissory agreement that has its warrant unambiguously in human action. Although this view is significantly different from fundamentalism, it can be dispensed with quickly in this context because its implications for animal biotechnology are quite like those of fundamentalism, and for similar reasons. Society might continue to accept existing conventions on the boundaries of morality, or people might, over time, come to revise them, just as they have with respect to social class, nationality, race, and gender. Again, a charismatic leader could affect this transition. Under a conventionalist view, if people agree that animal biotechnology is unethical, then it is.
Fundamentalism and conventionalism are attractive to the unreflective for obvious reasons, and have always had adherents among the intellectual elite. The mere fact that these views provide so little for making nonarbitrary judgments about subjects such as the ethics of genetic engineering has generally been thought to count against them.
Dualism. Dualism was the view of Descartes. It postulates distinct metaphysical substrates in mind and matter. The view relegates ethical, spiritual, and judgmental matters to the mind, where they quite literally take on a life and reality of their own. The dualist view might resolve the species boundary problem by replacing philosophical questions about the limits of human action with philosophical questions about the nature and extent of mind. For Descartes and natural scientists who followed him, the dualist solution was tactically attractive because, like fundamentalism, it allowed the science of matter t o simply ignore a series of sticky ethical and theological questions. If questions of morality and religion are t o be determined by metaphysical inquiry into the mental substrate, there is no reason to think that discoveries or theories developed by sciences of matter (e.g., the natural sciences) will have ethical implications. Dualism thus allows peace between natural scientists and theologians. The work of one can have no implication for the other.
However, this peace is vulnerable at precisely the point where genetically modified animals raise important philosophical questions. Descartes asserted that human beings possess minds or souls and that other animals do not, but first Darwin and now Watson and Crick provide reasons to question whether this assertion can be maintained without argument. While there are unquestionable differences between humans and other animal species, the preponderance of biological theory suggests that they are differences of degree rather than kind. DNA codes for the form of an organism, and human DNA is entirely consistent with the genetic language for all of life. The difference between a human and another mammal is far more evident at the organismal level than from a comparison of genomes. The human genome evidently contains instructions that produce an organism with a mental life. Molecular biology provides no basis for thinking that such genetic instructions are uniquely confined to the human species.
Dualism went out of fashion in the 19th century, being replaced especially by the philosophy of positivism. Positivism paralleled dualism in maintaining that science could have no ethical implications, but based this claim on the logical distinction between purely descriptive language and normative or prescriptive claims. Like dualism, positivism seemed to support a division of intellectual labor between scientists and those ethicists who were inclined to base moral judgments on metaphysical and religious claims. The positivist philosophy allowed scientists and theologians to ignore one another. Unlike dualism, positivism was silent with respect to how species boundaries might relate to the ethics of human action. For those who did not take up the naturalist view discussed below, the importance of boundaries was allowed to remain an implicit element of morality.
Dualism has enjoyed a philosophical renaissance during the last two decades. The philosophers and psychologists who have led this resurgence have been attentive to cognitive science, to artificial intelligence, to brain research, and to philosophy of language that stresses the computational and logical basis of mental representation and thought. They have not, for the most part, given much attention to genetics. Some in this group seem to assume that mind is a peculiarly human phenomenon, but others do not. Lacking an argument that identifies the limits of mind with the genome of the human species, dualism cannot succeed as a strategy for resolving biology's challenge to the implicit boundaries of the moral community. Dualists who attribute properties of mind to nonhumans are effectively following the naturalist strategy outlined below.
Naturalism. This view encompasses many philosophies that replace the implicit assumption of boundaries with less general claims that establish ethical claims upon the basis of a persons's having certain needs, interests, capacities, or capabilities. Bentham (17891, for example, argued that the foundation for ethical significance can be much broader than pleasure and pain, to include capacities for individual and group fulfillment.
The naturalist view provides a philosophical basis for systematic evaluation and modification of consensus norms, and supplants the assumption that ethical values are defined with respect to rational adult human beings with an argument that conforms to the basic pattern. For example, ethical responsibility becomes defined with respect to concepts of intentional action that correspond to the capacity of adult humans. Norms of friendship, family loyalty, or selffulfillment become defined with respect to the capacity for participating in those activities that adults are expected to develop. A fully developed naturalist philosophy would require substantially more development than can be supplied in this context. Many versions of both secular and theological ethics would qualify as naturalist, as the term has been used.
It may be possible to reconcile naturalist views with contemporary biology. It is far from evident that ethically significant traits have a genetic basis. Nevertheless, scientifically informed observers such as Wilson (1978) or Dawkins (1976) have suggested as much. Complex patterns of individual and social behavior may be a function of culture, but even these may be presumed to overlay neurological structure that is partially determined by genes. There will be philosophical problems posed by any attempt to claim that some capacities have ethical significance, or that others do not, but these problems are not different in kind from familiar problems of philosophical ethics.
The naturalist strategy does have implications for animal biotechnology. Capacities become the basis for ethical evaluations. The issue of whether non-human animals have ethically relevant capacities is one that must be settled by empirical and conceptual analysis. If farm animals have ethically relevant capacities, such as a capacity for physical pain or social and behavioral needs, then these capacities must be respected by agricultural producers and animal scien-tists. Genetic modifications that risk serious dysfunctions should not be undertaken lightly. It will be fairly easy to justify the use of animals for life-saving activities such as the production of pharmaceuticals or transplantable organs. It will be more difficult to defend practices that severely compromise farm animal functions for an increase in productivity. The justification of research on transgenic animals to improve our understanding of the biology of farm animals falls in between. The naturalist paradigm suggests that, for the time being, transgenic animal experiments should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, much as animal care and use committees currently do for all use of animals in research.
Conclusion
The developers of recombinant DNA technology have exhibited concern and responsibility for ethical issues. The ethics of biotechnology includes arguments for the development of transgenic animals, as well as objections and limitations. Research on ethical issues in biotechnology can improve the evaluation and implementation of transgenics for farm animals by analyzing arguments of ethical concern and by presenting logically rigorous arguments for alternative perspectives.
Ethical issues associated with food safety, with environmental impact, and with unintended social consequences are not unique to transgenic technologies, however. Concern for ethical issues in recombinant DNA technology often makes vague reference to "limits." This element of ethical concern can be interpreted as an expression of anxiety or uncertainty about the definition of the moral community and the identification of borders or limits for ethical concern. Transgenic animals reinforce a challenge to implicitly accepted borders that define the scope of the moral community in terms of the human species.
Although there are several philosophical responses to biology's challenge to our implicit consensus morality, most are either incomplete or arbitrary in terms of their implications for transgenic animals. Naturalist philosophies meet the challenge by identifying specific capacities, interests, or needs as the object of moral concern. This strategy preserves the content of consensus morality, but it also implies that the relevant capacities, interests, and needs are significant without regard to the species in which they occur. Far from implying that transgenic animals are unacceptable, the naturalist paradigm implies only that the interests and needs of transgenic animals must be balanced against those of human beings. Many uses of recombinant DNA technology will not compromise animal interests at all.
